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Abstract: 
We study the problem of a policymaker who seeks to set policy optimally in an economy 
where the true economic structure is unobserved, and policymakers optimally learn from their 
observations of the economy. This is a classic problem of learning and control, variants of 
which have been studied in the past, but little with forward-looking variables which are a key 
component of modern policy-relevant models. As in most Bayesian learning problems, the 
optimal policy typically includes an experimentation component reflecting the endogeneity of 
information. We develop algorithms to solve numerically for the Bayesian optimal policy 
(BOP). However the BOP is only feasible in relatively small models, and thus we also 
consider a simpler specification we term adaptive optimal policy (AOP) which allows 
policymakers to update their beliefs but shortcuts the experimentation motive. In our setting, 
the AOP is significantly easier to compute, and in many cases provides a good approximation 
to the BOP. We provide a simple example to illustrate the role of learning and 
experimentation in an MJLQ framework. 
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 1 Introduction
We study the problem of a policymaker (more concretely, a central bank), who seeks to set policy
optimally in an economy where the true economic structure is unobserved and the policymaker
optimally learn from their observations of the economy. This is a classic problem of learning and
control with model uncertainty, variants of which have been studied in the past, but very little has
been done with forward-looking variables, which are a key component of modern policy-relevant
models. Our model of the economy takes the form of a so-called Markov jump-linear-quadratic
(MJLQ) system, extended to include forward-looking variables. In this setup, model uncertainty
takes the form of di®erent \modes" or regimes that follow a Markov process. This setup can be
adapted to handle many di®erent forms of model uncertainty, but yet provides a relatively simple
structure for analysis.
In previous work, discussed in more detail below, we studied optimal policy design in models
of this class when policymakers could observe the current mode. In this paper we focus in detail
on the arguably more relevant situation, particularly for the model uncertainty applications which
interest us, in which the modes are not directly observable. Thus decision makers must ¯lter their
observations to make inferences about the current mode. As in most Bayesian learning problems,
the optimal policy thus typically includes an experimentation component re°ecting the endogeneity
of information. This class of problems has a long history in economics, and it is well-known that
solutions are di±cult to obtain. We develop algorithms to solve numerically for the optimal policy.1
Due to the curse of dimensionality, the Bayesian optimal policy (BOP) is only feasible in rel-
atively small models. Confronted with these di±culties, we also consider adaptive optimal policy
(AOP). In this case, the policymaker in each period does update the probability distribution of
the current mode in a Bayesian way, but the optimal policy is computed each period under the
assumption that the policymaker will not learn in the future from observations. In our MJLQ set-
ting, the AOP is signi¯cantly easier to compute, and in many cases provides a good approximation
to the BOP. Moreover, the AOP analysis is of some interest in its own right, as it is closely related
to speci¯cations of adaptive learning which have been widely studied in macroeconomics (see [6]
for an overview). Further, the AOP speci¯cation rules out the experimentation which some may
view as objectionable in a policy context.2
1 In addition to the classic literature (on such problems as a monopolist learning its demand curve), Wieland
[14]-[15] and Beck and Wieland [1] have recently examined Bayesian optimal policy and optimal experimentation in
a context similar to ours but without forward-looking variables.
2 In addition, AOP is useful for technical reasons as it gives us a good starting point for our more intensiveIn later drafts of this paper, we intend to apply our methods to a relatively simple version of a
benchmark New-Keynesian monetary model which is estimated from US data. We will then show
how probability distributions of forecasts of relevant variables can be constructed for the optimal
policy and for other, restricted policies, such as Taylor rules. In this preliminary version, we provide
a simple example to illustrate the role of learning and experimentation in an MJLQ framework and
compare the policy functions and value functions under NL, AOP, and BOP. Of particular interest
is how uncertainty a®ects policy, and how learning interacts with the optimal policy decisions. We
also diagnose the aspects of the model which in°uence the size of experimentation motive, and thus
drive the di®erences between the Bayesian and adaptive optimal policies.
MJLQ models have also been widely studied in the control-theory literature for the special
case when the model modes are observable and there are no forward-looking variables (see Costa,
Fragoso, and Marques [4] (henceforth CFM) and the references therein).3 More recently, Zampolli
[16] has used such an MJLQ model to examine monetary policy under shifts between regimes with
and without an asset-market bubble. Blake and Zampolli [2] provide an extension of the MJLQ
model with observable modes to include forward-looking variables and present an algorithm for the
solution of an equilibrium resulting from optimization under discretion. Svensson and Williams
[13] provide a more general extension of the MJLQ framework with forward-looking variables and
present algorithms for the solution of an equilibrium resulting from optimization under commitment
in a timeless perspective as well as arbitrary time-varying or time-invariant policy rules, using the
recursive saddlepoint method of Marcet and Marimon [9]. They also provide two concrete examples:
an estimated backward-looking model (a three-mode variant of Rudebusch and Svensson [11]) and
an estimated forward-looking model (a three-mode variant of Lind¶ e [8]). Svensson and Williams
[13] also extend the MJLQ framework to the more realistic case of unobservable modes, although
without introducing learning and inference about the probability distribution of modes, which is
our focus here.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 lays out the basic model an MJLQ system with
forward-looking variables. Sections 3, 4, and 5 derive the optimal policy under no learning (NL),
the adaptive optimal policy (AOP), and the Bayesian optimal policy (BOP). Section 6 provides a
simple example and compares the value functions and policy functions for these three alternatives
numerical calculations in the BOP case.
3 do Val and Ba» sar [5] provide an application of an adaptive-control MJLQ problem in economics. In a di®erent
setting, Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent [3] have recently studied how well adaptive policies approximate the optimal
policies.
2and clari¯es the bene¯ts and costs of optimal experimentation.
2 The model
We consider a Markov Jump-Linear-Quadratic (MJLQ) model of an economy with forward-looking
variables. The economy has a private sector and a policymaker. We let Xt denote an nX-vector of
predetermined variables in period t, xt an nx-vector of forward-looking variables, and it an ni-vector
of (policymaker) instruments (control variables).4 We let model uncertainty be represented by nj
possible (model) modes and let jt 2 Nj ´ f1;2;:::;njg denote the mode in period t. The model of
the economy can then be written
Xt+1 = A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1xt + B1jt+1it + C1jt+1"t+1; (2.1)
EtHjt+1xt+1 = A21jtXt + A22jtxt + B2jtit + C2jt"t; (2.2)
where "t is a multivariate normally distributed random i.i.d. n"-vector of shocks with mean zero
and contemporaneous covariance matrix In". The matrices A11j, A12j, ..., C2j have the appropriate
dimensions and depend on the mode j. Note that the matrices on the right side of (2.1) depend
on the mode jt+1 in period t + 1, whereas the matrices on the right side of (2.2) depend on the
mode jt in period t. Equation (2.1) then determines the predetermined variables in period t+1 as
a function of the mode and shocks in period t+1 and the predetermined variables, forward-looking
variables, and instruments in period t. Equation (2.2) determines the forward-looking variables in
period t as a function of the mode and shocks in period t, the expectations in period t of next
period's mode and forward-looking variables, and the predetermined variables and instruments in
period t. The matrix A22j is invertible for each j 2 Nj.
The mode jt follows a Markov process with the transition matrix P ´ [Pjk].5 Without loss of
generality, we assume that jt and "t are independently distributed.6 We also assume that C1j"t
and C2k"t are independent for all j;k 2 Nj. These shocks, along with the modes, are the driving
forces in the model and they are not directly observed. For technical reasons, it is convenient but
not necessary that they are independent. We let pt = (p1t;:::;pnjt)0 denote the true probability
distribution of jt in period t. We let ptjt denote the policymaker's and private sector's estimate of
4 The ¯rst component of Xt may be unity, in order to allow for mode-dependent intercepts in the model.
5 Obvious special cases are P = Inj, when the modes are completely persistent, and Pj: = ¹ p
0 (j 2 Nj), when the
modes are serially i.i.d. with probability distribution ¹ p.
6 Because mode-dependent intercepts are included in the model, there are still additive mode-dependent shocks.
3the probability distribution in the beginning of period t. The prediction equation is
pt+1jt = P0ptjt: (2.3)
We let the operator Et[¢] in the expression EtHjt+1xt+1 on the left side of (2.2) denote expec-
tations in period t conditional on policymaker and private-sector information in the beginning of
period t, including Xt, it, and ptjt, but excluding jt and "t. Thus, the maintained assumption is
symmetric information between the policymaker and the (aggregate) private sector. Since forward-
looking variables will be allowed to depend on jt, parts of the private sector, but not the aggregate
private sector, may be able to observe jt and parts of "t.7 The precise informational assumptions
and the determination of ptjt will be speci¯ed below.
We let the policymaker's intertemporal loss function in period t be
Et
1 X
¿=0
±¿L(Xt+¿;xt+¿;it+¿;jt+¿) (2.4)
where ± is a discount factor satisfying 0 < ± < 1, and the period loss, L(Xt;xt;it;jt), satis¯es
L(Xt;xt;it;jt) ´
2
4
Xt
xt
it
3
5
0
Wjt
2
4
Xt
xt
it
3
5; (2.5)
where the matrix Wj (j 2 Nj) is positive semide¯nite. We assume that the policymaker optimizes
under commitment in a timeless perspective. As explained below, we will then add the term
¥t¡1
1
±
EtHjtxt (2.6)
to the intertemporal loss function in period t, where, as we shall see below, the nx-vector ¥t¡1 is
the mean of the Lagrange multipliers for equation (2.2) from the optimization problem in period
t ¡ 1.
For the special case of no forward-looking variables (nx = 0), the model consists of (2.1) only,
without the term A12jt+1xt; the period loss function depends on Xt, it, and jt only; and there is no
role for the Lagrange multipliers ¥t¡1 or the term (2.6).
We will distinguish three cases: (1) Optimal policy when there is no learning (NL), (2) Adaptive
optimal policy (AOP), and (3) Bayesian optimal policy (BOP). By NL, we refer to a situation when
the policymaker (and aggregate private sector) has a probability distribution ptjt over the modes
in period t and updates the probability distribution in future periods using the transition matrix
only, so the updating equation is
pt+1jt+1 = P0ptjt. (2.7)
7 [The microfoundations of these assumption may need further clari¯cation.]
4That is, the policymaker and the private sector do not use observations of the variables in the
economy to update the probability distribution. The policymaker then determines optimal policy
in period t conditional on ptjt and (2.7). This is a variant of a case examined in Svensson and
Williams [13].
By AOP, we refer to a situation when the policymaker in period t determines optimal policy
as in the NL case, but then uses observations of the realization of the variables in the economy to
update its probability distribution according to Bayes Theorem. In this case, the instruments will
generally have an e®ect on the updating of future probability distributions and through this channel
separately a®ect the intertemporal loss. However, the policymaker does not exploit that channel
in determining optimal policy. That is, the policymaker does not do any optimal experimentation.
By BOP, we refer to a situation when the policymaker acknowledges that the current instruments
will a®ect future inference and updating of the probability distribution and calculates optimal policy
taking this separate channel into account. Therefore, BOP includes optimal experimentation, where
for instance the policymaker may pursue policy that increases losses in the short run but improves
the inference of the true probability distribution and therefore allows losses in the longer run.
3 Optimal policy with no learning
We ¯rst consider the NL case. Svensson and Williams [13] derive the equilibrium under commit-
ment in a timeless perspective for the case when Xt, xt, and it are observable in period t, jt is
unobservable, and the updating equation for ptjt is given by (2.7). Observations of Xt, xt, and it
are then not used to update ptjt.
It is worth noting what type of belief speci¯cation underlies the assumption that the policymaker
does not learn from his or her beliefs. In general this requires the policymaker to have subjective
beliefs which are inconsistent or di®er from the true data-generating process. A ¯rst possibility is
that the policymaker (incorrectly) views the modes jt as being drawn independently each period t
from the the exogenously given distribution ptjt given by (2.7) in period t. In particular, if ptjt = ¹ p,
he or she views the exogenous distribution as being the unconditional distribution ¹ p associated
with the transition matrix P. For this possibility, there is no (perceived) gain from learning. Hence
not updating beliefs is optimal for this subjective probability distribution. This is implicitly the
case considered in the September 2005 version of Svensson and Williams [13]. A second possibility,
suggested to us by Alexei Onatski, is that the policymaker in period t forgets past observations of the
5economy, such as Xt¡1;Xt¡2;:::, when making decisions in period t. Without past observations,
the policymaker cannot use current observations to update the beliefs. This possibility has the
advantage that the policymaker need not view the modes as being independently drawn, exploiting
the fact that the true modes may be serially correlated. However, forgetting past observations
implies that the beliefs do not satisfy the law of iterated expectations. Here we will study this
second possibility, but the fact that the law of iterated expectations does not hold requires the
slightly more complicated derivations below.
As a further di®erence, Svensson and Williams [13] assumed C2jt ´ 0. In the full information
case, this is an innocuous assumption, since if C2jt 6´ 0 the vector of predetermined variables and
the block of equations for the predetermined variables, (2.1), can be augmented with the vector
X"t and the equations X";t+1 = C2jt+1"t+1, respectively. Here we allow C2jt 6´ 0 and keep track
of the term C2jt"t, since this term will serve as the shock in the equations for the forward-looking
variables, without which inference in some cases becomes trivial.8
It will be practical to replace equation (2.2) by the two equivalent equations,
EtHjt+1xt+1 = zt; (3.1)
0 = A21jtXt + A22jtxt ¡ zt + B2jtit + C2jt"t; (3.2)
where we introduce the nx-vector of additional forward-looking variables, zt. Introducing this vector
is a practical way of keeping track of the expectations term on the left side of (2.2).
Furthermore, it will be practical to use (3.2) and solve xt as a function of Xt, zt, it, jt, and "t
xt = ~ x(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t) ´ A¡1
22jt(zt ¡ A21jtXt ¡ B2jtit ¡ C2jt"t): (3.3)
We note that, for given jt, this function is linear in Xt, zt, it, and "t.
For the application of the recursive saddlepoint method (see Marcet and Marimon [9], Svensson
and Williams [13], and Svensson [12] for details of the recursive saddlepoint method), the dual
period loss function can be written
Et~ L( ~ Xt;zt;it;°t;jt;"t) ´
X
j
pjtjt
Z
~ L( ~ Xt;zt;it;°t;j;"t)'("t)d"t;
where ~ Xt ´ (X0
t;¥0
t¡1)0 is the (nX + nx)-vector of extended predetermined variables (that is,
including the nx-vector ¥t¡1), °t is an nx-vector of Lagrange multipliers, and '(¢) denotes a generic
8 Alternatively, we could allow C2jt ´ 0 and add the corresponding predetermined variables, but then we have to
assume that those predetermined variables are not observable. It turns out that the ¯ltering problem becomes much
more di±cult when some predetermined variables as well as modes are unobservable.
6probability density function (for "t, the standard normal density function), and where
~ L( ~ Xt;zt;it;°t;jt;"t) ´ L[Xt; ~ x(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t);it;jt] ¡ °0
tzt + ¥0
t¡1
1
±
Hjt~ x(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t): (3.4)
Then, the somewhat unusual Bellman equation for the dual optimization problem can be written
~ V (st) = Et^ V (st;jt) ´
X
j pjtjt^ V (st;j)
= max
°t
min
(zt;it)
Etf~ L( ~ Xt;zt;it;°t;jt;"t) + ±^ V [g(st;zt;it;°t;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1);jt+1]g
´ max
°t
min
(zt;it)
X
j pjtjt
Z · ~ L( ~ Xt;zt;it;°t;j;"t)
+±
P
k Pjk ^ V [g(st;zt;it;°t;j;"t;k;"t+1);k]
¸
'("t)'("t+1)d"td"t+1:
(3.5)
where st ´ ( ~ X0
t;p0
tjt)0 denotes the perceived state of the economy (\perceived" in the sense that it
includes the perceived probability distribution, ptjt, but not the true mode) and (st;jt) denotes the
true state of the economy (\true" in the sense that it includes the true mode of the economy). As
we discuss in more detail below, it is necessary to include the mode jt in the state vector because
the beliefs do not satisfy the law of iterated expectations. In the BOP case beliefs do satisfy this
property, so the state vector is simply st. Also note that in the Bellman equation we require that
all the choice variables respect the information constraints and thus depend on the perceived state
st but not the mode j directly.
The optimization is subject to the transition equation for Xt+1,
Xt+1 = A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1~ x(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t) + B1jt+1it + C1jt+1"t+1; (3.6)
where we have substituted ~ x(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t) for xt; the new dual transition equation for ¥t,
¥t = °t; (3.7)
and the transition equation for pt+1jt+1, (2.7). This can be combined into the transition equation
for st+1,
st+1 ´
2
4
Xt+1
¥t
pt+1jt+1
3
5 = g(st;zt;it;°t;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1)
´
2
4
A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1~ x(Xt;zt;it;j;"t) + B1jt+1it + C1jt+1"t+1
°t
P0ptjt
3
5: (3.8)
7It is straightforward to see that the solution of the dual optimization problem is linear in ~ Xt
for given st,
~ {t ´
2
4
zt
it
°t
3
5 = ~ {(st) ´
2
4
z(st)
i(st)
°(st)
3
5 = F(ptjt) ~ Xt ´
2
4
Fz(ptjt)
Fi(ptjt)
F°(ptjt)
3
5 ~ Xt; (3.9)
xt = x(st;jt;"t) ´ ~ x(Xt;z(st);i(st);jt;"t) ´ Fx ~ X(ptjt;jt) ~ Xt + Fx"(ptjt;jt)"t: (3.10)
This solution is also the solution to the primal optimization problem. We note that xt is linear in
"t for given ptjt and jt. The equilibrium transition equation is then given by
st+1 = ¹ g(st;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1) ´ g[st;z(st);i(st);°(st);jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1]:
As can be easily veri¯ed, the (unconditional) dual value function ~ V (st) is quadratic in ~ Xt for
given ptjt, taking the form
~ V (st) ´ ~ X0
t ~ V ~ X ~ X(ptjt) ~ Xt + w(ptjt):
The conditional dual value function ^ V (st;jt) gives the dual intertemporal loss conditional on the
true state of the economy, (st;jt). It follows that this function satis¯es
^ V (st;j) ´
Z · ~ L( ~ Xt;z(st);i(st);°(st);j;"t)
+±
P
k Pjk ^ V [¹ g(st;j;"t;k;"t+1);k]
¸
'("t)'("t+1)d"td"t+1 (j 2 Nj):
The function ^ V (st;jt) is also quadratic in ~ Xt for given ptjt and jt,
^ V (st;jt) ´ ~ X0
t ^ V ~ X ~ X(ptjt;jt) ~ Xt + ^ w(ptjt;jt):
It follows that we have
~ V ~ X ~ X(ptjt) ´
X
j pjtjt^ V ~ X ~ X(ptjt;j); w(ptjt) ´
X
j pjtjt ^ w(ptjt;j):
The value function for the primal problem, with the period loss function EtL(Xt;xt;it;jt) rather
than Et~ L( ~ Xt;zt;it;°t;jt;"t), satis¯es
V (st) ´ ~ V (st) ¡ ¥0
t¡1
1
±
X
j
pjtjtHj
Z
x(st;j;"t)'("t)d"t
= ~ V (st) ¡ ¥0
t¡1
1
±
X
j
pjtjtHjx(st;j;0) (3.11)
(where the second equality follows since x(st;jt;"t) is linear in "t for given st and jt). It is quadratic
in ~ Xt for given ptjt,
V (st) ´ ~ X0
tV ~ X ~ X(ptjt) ~ Xt + w(ptjt)
8(the scalar w(ptjt) in the primal value function is obviously identical to that in the dual value
function). This is the value function conditional on ~ Xt and ptjt after Xt has been observed but
before xt has been observed, taking into account that jt and "t are not observed. Hence, the second
term on the right side of (3.11) contains the expectation of Hjtxt conditional on that information.9
For future reference, we note that the value function for the primal problem also satis¯es
V (st) ´
X
j pjtjt· V (st;j);
where the conditional value function, · V (st;jt), satis¯es
· V (st;j) =
Z ½
L[Xt;x(st;j;"t);i(st);j]
+±
P
k Pjk · V [¹ g(st;j;"t;k;"t+1);k]
¾
'("t)'("t+1)d"td"t+1 (j 2 Nj): (3.12)
3.1 The case without forward-looking variables
For the case without forward-looking variables, the recursive saddlepoint method is not needed.
The transition equation for Xt+1 is
Xt+1 = Ajt+1Xt + Bjt+1it + Cjt+1"t+1; (3.13)
and the period loss function is
EtL(Xt;it;jt) ´
X
j pjtjtL(Xt;it;j); (3.14)
where
L(Xt;it;jt) ´
·
Xt
it
¸0
Wjt
·
Xt
it
¸
: (3.15)
The transition equation is
st+1 ´
·
Xt+1
pt+1jt+1
¸
= g(st;it;jt+1;"t+1) ´
·
Ajt+1Xt + Bjt+1it + Cjt+1"t+1
P0ptjt
¸
: (3.16)
The Bellman equation for the derivation of the optimal policy is
V (st) = Et^ V (st;jt) ´
X
j pjtjt^ V (st;j)
= min
it
EtfL(Xt;it;jt) + ±^ V [g(st;it;jt+1;"t+1);jt+1]g
´ min
it
X
j pjtjt
·
L(Xt;it;j) + ±
X
k Pjk
Z
^ V [g(st;it;k;"t+1);k]'("t+1)d"t+1
¸
: (3.17)
9 To be precise, the observation of Xt, which depends on C1jt"t, allows some inference of "t, "tjt. xt will depend on
jt and on "t, but on "t only through C2jt"t. By assumption C1j"t and C2k"t are independent. Hence, any observation
of Xt and C1j"t does not convey any information about C2j"t, so EtC2jt"t = 0.
9This results in the optimal policy function,
it = i(st) ´ Fi(ptjt)Xt; (3.18)
which is linear in Xt for given ptjt. The equilibrium transition equation is then
st+1 = ¹ g(st;jt+1;"t+1) ´ g(st;i(st);jt+1;"t+1): (3.19)
The value function, V (st), is quadratic in Xt for given ptjt,
V (st) = X0
tVXX(ptjt)Xt + w(ptjt):
The conditional value function, ^ V (st;it), satis¯es
^ V (st;j) ´ L[Xt;i(st);j] + ±
X
k Pjk
Z
^ V [¹ g(st;k;"t+1);k]'("t+1)d"t+1 (j 2 Nj):
4 Adaptive optimal policy
Consider now the case of AOP. We assume that C2jt 6´ 0 and that both "t and jt are unobservable.
The estimate ptjt is the result of Bayesian updating, using all information available, but the optimal
policy in period t is computed under the perceived updating equation (2.7). That is, the fact that
the policy choice will a®ect future pt+¿jt+¿ and that future expected loss will change when pt+¿jt+¿
changes is disregarded. Under the assumption that the expectations on the left side of (2.2) are
conditional on (2.7), the variables zt, it, °t, and xt in period t are still determined by (3.9) and
(3.10).
In order to determine the updating equation for ptjt, we specify an explicit sequence of infor-
mation revelation as follows, in no less than nine steps:
First, the policymaker and the private sector enters period t with the prior ptjt¡1. They know
Xt¡1, xt¡1 = x(st¡1;jt¡1;"t¡1), zt¡1 = z(st¡1), it¡1 = i(st¡1), and ¥t¡1 = °(st¡1) from the
previous period.
Second, in the beginning of period t, the mode jt and the vector of shocks "t are realized. Then
the vector of predetermined variables Xt is realized according to (2.1).
Third, the policymaker and the private sector observe Xt. They then know ~ Xt ´ (X0
t;¥0
t¡1)0.
They do not observe jt or "t
Fourth, the policymaker and the private sector update the prior ptjt¡1 to the posterior ptjt
according to Bayes Theorem and the updating equation
pjtjt =
'(Xtjjt = j;Xt¡1;xt¡1;it¡1;ptjt¡1)
'(XtjXt¡1;xt¡1;it¡1;ptjt¡1)
pjtjt¡1 (j 2 Nj); (4.1)
10where '(¢) denotes a generic density function.10 Then the policymaker and the private sector know
st ´ ( ~ X0
t;p0
tjt)0.
Fifth, the policymaker solves the dual optimization problem, determines it = i(st), and imple-
ments/announces the instrument setting it.
Sixth, the private-sector (and policymaker) expectations,
zt = EtHjt+1xt+1 ´ E[Hjt+1xt+1 jst];
are formed. In equilibrium, these expectations will be determined by (3.9). In order to understand
their determination better, we look at this in some detail.
These expectations are by assumption formed before xt is observed. The private sector and
the policymaker know that xt will in equilibrium be determined next period according to (3.10).
Hence, they can form expectations of the soon-to-be determined xt conditional on jt = j,11
xjtjt = x(st;j;0): (4.2)
The private sector and the policymaker can also infer ¥t from
¥t = °(st): (4.3)
This allows the private sector and the policymaker to form the expectations
zt = z(st) = Et[Hjt+1xt+1 jst] =
X
j;k PjkpjtjtHkxk;t+1jjt; (4.4)
where
xk;t+1jjt =
Z
x
0
@
2
4
A11kXt + A12kx(st;j;"t) + B1ki(st)
¥t
P0ptjt
3
5;k;"t+1
1
A'("t)'("t+1)d"td"t+1
= x
0
@
2
4
A11kXt + A12kx(st;j;0) + B1ki(st)
¥t
P0ptjt
3
5;k;0
1
A;
where we have exploited the linearity of xt = x(st;jt;"t) and xt+1 = x(st+1;jt+1;"t+1) in "t and
"t+1. Note that zt = z(st) = EtHjt+1xt+1 is formed conditional on the belief that the probability
10 The policymaker and private sector also estimate the shocks "tjt as "tjt =
P
j pjtjt"jtjt, where "jtjt ´ Xt ¡
A11jXt¡1 ¡A12jxt¡1 ¡B1jit¡1 (j 2 Nj). However, because of the assumed (convenient) independence of C1j"t and
C2k"t, j;k 2 Nj, we do not need to keep track of "jtjt.
11 Note that 0 instead of "jtjt enters above. This is because the inference "jtjt above is inference about C1j"t, whereas
xt depends on "t through C2j"t. Since we assume that C1j"t and C2j"t are independent, there is no inference of C2j"t
from observing Xt. Hence, EtC2jt"t ´ 0. Because of the linearity of xt in "t, the integration of xt over "t results in
x(st;jt;0t).
11distribution in period t + 1 will be given by pt+1jt+1 = P0ptjt, not by the true updating equation
that we are about to specify.
Seventh, after the expectations zt = z(st) = EtHjt+1xt+1 have been formed, xt is determined as
a function of Xt, zt, it, jt, and "t by (3.3).
Eight, the policymaker and the private sector then use the observed xt to update ptjt to the new
posterior p+
tjt according to Bayes Theorem, via the updating equation
p+
jtjt =
'(xtjjt = j;Xt;zt;it;ptjt)
'(xtjXt;zt;it;ptjt)
pjtjt (j 2 Nj): (4.5)
Ninth, the policymaker and the private sector then leave period t and enter period t + 1 with
the prior pt+1jt given by the prediction equation
pt+1jt = P0p+
tjt: (4.6)
In the beginning of period t + 1, the mode jt+1 and the vector of shocks "t+1 are realized, and
Xt+1 is determined by (2.1) and observed by the policymaker and private sector. The sequence of
the nine steps above then repeats itself.
Since C1j"t is a random nX-vector that, for given j, is normally distributed with mean zero and
covariance matrix C1jC0
1j (assume for simplicity that the rank of C1jC0
1j is nX; if not, for instance
when the predetermined variables include lagged endogenous variables, choose the appropriate
nonsingular submatrix and the appropriate subvector of Xt), we know that
'(Xtjjt = j;Xt¡1;xt¡1;it¡1;ptjt¡1) ´ Ã(Xt ¡ A11jXt¡1 ¡ A12jxt¡1 ¡ B1jit¡1;C1jC0
1j); (4.7)
where
Ã(";§"") ´
1
p
(2¼)n" j§""j
exp
µ
¡
1
2
"0§¡1
"" "
¶
denotes the density function of a random n"-vector " with a multivariate normal distribution with
mean zero and covariance matrix §"". Furthermore,
'(XtjXt¡1;xt¡1;it¡1;ptjt¡1) ´
X
j
pjtjt¡1Ã(Xt ¡ A11jXt¡1 + A12jxt¡1 + B1jit¡1;C1jC0
1j): (4.8)
Thus, we know the details of the updating equation (4.1).
Since C2k"t is a random nx-vector that is normally distributed with mean zero and covari-
ance matrix C2kC0
2k (assume that the rank of C2kC0
2k is nx, or select the appropriate nonsingular
submatrix and appropriate subvector), we know that
'(xtjjt = k;Xt;zt;it;ptjt) ´ Ã[zt ¡ A21kXt ¡ A22kxt ¡ B2kit;C2kC0
2k]; (4.9)
12'(xtjXt;zt;it;ptjt) ´
X
k
pktjtÃ[zt ¡ A21kXt ¡ A22kxt ¡ B2kit;C2kC0
2k]: (4.10)
Thus, we know the details of the updating equation (4.5).
In particular, it follows that we can write the updating equation (4.5) as
p+
tjt = Q+(st;zt;it;jt;"t) (4.11)
´ [Q+
1 (st;zt;it;jt;"t);:::;Q+
nj(st;zt;it;jt;"t)]0;
where
Q+
k (st;zt;it;jt;"t) ´
Ã[Zk(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t);C2kC0
2k]
P
k pktjtÃ[Zk(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t);C2kC0
2k]
pktjt (k 2 Nj) (4.12)
and
Zk(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t) ´ zt ¡ A21kXt ¡ A22k~ x(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t) ¡ B2kit;
where we use (3.3) to express xt as a function of Xt, zt, it, jt, and "t, and used this to eliminate xt
from the ¯rst argument of Ã(¢;¢) in (4.9) and (4.10).
The transition equation for pt+1jt+1 can then ¯nally be written
pt+1jt+1 = Q(st;zt;it;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1); (4.13)
where Q(st;zt;it;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1) is de¯ned by the combination of (4.1) for period t+1 with (3.6),
(4.6), and (4.11).
The equilibrium transition equation is then given by
st+1 ´
2
4
Xt+1
¥t
pt+1jt+1
3
5 = ¹ g(st;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1)
´
2
4
A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1x(st;jt;"t) + B1jt+1i(st) + C1jt+1"t+1
°(st)
Q(st;z(st);i(st);jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1)
3
5; (4.14)
where the third row is given by the true updating equation (4.13) together with the policy function
(3.9). Thus we note that in this AOP case there is a distinction between the \perceived" transition
equation, which includes the perceived updating equation, (2.7), and the \true" transition equation,
which includes the true updating equation (4.13).
Note that V (st) in (3.11), which is subject to the perceived transition equation, (3.8), does not
give the true (unconditional) value function for the AOP case. This is instead given by
¹ V (st) ´
X
j pjtjt· V (st;j);
13where the true conditional value function, · V (st;jt), satis¯es
· V (st;j) =
Z ½
L[Xt;x(st;j;"t);i(st);j]
+±
P
k Pjk · V [¹ g(st;j;"t;k;"t+1);k]
¾
'("t)'("t+1)d"td"t+1 (j 2 Nj): (4.15)
That is, the true value function ¹ V (st) takes into account the true updating equation for ptjt, (4.13),
whereas the optimal policy, (3.9), and the perceived value function, V (st) in (3.11), are conditional
on the perceived updating equation (2.7) and thereby the perceived transition equation (3.8). Note
also that ¹ V (st) is the value function after Xt has been observed but before xt is observed, so it
is conditional on ptjt rather than p+
tjt. Since the full transition equation (4.14) is no longer linear
due to the belief updating (4.13), the true value function ¹ V (st) is no longer quadratic in Xt for
given ptjt. Thus more complex numerical methods are required to evaluate losses in the AOP case,
although policy is still determined simply as in the NL case.
Note that12
EtQ(st;z(st);i(st);jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1) = pt+1jt = P0ptjt: (4.16)
The di®erence between the true updating equation for pt+1jt+1, (4.13), and the perceived updating
equation (2.7) is that, in the true updating equation, pt+1jt+1 under AOP becomes a random variable
from the point of view of period t, with the mean equal to pt+1jt+1. This is because pt+1jt+1 depends
on the realization of jt+1 and "t+1. We can hence write the true transition equation for pt+1jt+1 as
pt+1jt+1 = P0ptjt + vt+1
where vt+1 ´ [Q(st;z(st);i(st);jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1) ¡ P0ptjt], and thus Etvt+1 = 0. The ¯rst term on
the right side is the prediction, pt+1jt = Etpt+1jt+1 = P0ptjt and the second term is the innovation
in pt+1jt+1 that results from the Bayesian updating and depends on the realization of jt+1 and "t+1.
If the conditional value function · V (st+1;jt+1) under NL is concave in pt+1jt+1 for given Xt+1
and jt+1, then by Jensen's inequality the true expected future loss under AOP will be lower than
the true expected future loss under NL. Furthermore, under BOP, it may be possible to adjust
policy so as to increase the variance of pt+1jt+1, that is, achieve a mean-preserving spread which
might further reduce the expected future loss. This amounts to optimal experimentation.
4.1 The case without forward-looking variables
For the case without forward-looking variables, again the recursive saddlepoint method is not
needed. With the transition equation for the predetermined variables (3.13) and the period loss
12 Of course, (4.13) is in expectation consistent with the prediction equation, (2.3). Equation (4.16) follows since,
for k 2 Nj,
P
j;h pjtjtPjh
R
Qk(st;zt;it;j;"t;h;"t+1)'("t)'("t+1)d"td"t+1 = pk;t+1jt =
P
j pjtjtPjk :
14function (3.14), the optimal policy in the AOP case is determined as in the NL case by the solution
to (3.17), subject to the perceived transition equation (3.16) and given by the same policy function,
(3.18).
The optimal policy under AOP is calculated under the perceived updating equation, (2.7). The
true updating equation for pt+1jt+1 is
pt+1jt+1 = Q(st;it;jt+1;"t+1); (4.17)
where
Q(st;it;jt+1;"t+1) ´ [Q1(st;it;jt+1;"t+1);:::;Qnj(st;it;jt+1;"t+1)]0;
Qk(st;it;jt+1;"t+1) ´
Ã[(Ajt+1 ¡ Ak)Xt + (Bjt+1 ¡ Bk)it + Cjt+1"t+1;CkC0
k]
P
j;k PjkpjtjtÃ[(Ajt+1 ¡ Ak)Xt + (Bjt+1 ¡ Bk)it + Cjt+1"t+1;CkC0
k]
X
j Pjkpjtjt:
The equilibrium transition equation is
st+1 = ¹ g(st;jt+1;"t+1) ´
·
Ajt+1Xt + Bjt+1i(st) + Cjt+1"t+1
Q(st;i(st);jt+1;"t+1)
¸
:
The true (unconditional) value function, ¹ V (st), taking into account that pt+1jt+1 will be updated
according to (4.17) and ex post depend on jt+1 and "t+1, is given by
¹ V (st) ´
X
j pjtjt· V (st;j);
where the true conditional value function · V (st;j) satis¯es
· V (st;j) = L[Xt;i(st);j] + ±
X
k Pjk
Z
· V [¹ g(st;k;"t+1);k]'("t+1)d"t+1:
Again, if the conditional value function · V (st+1;jt+1) under NL is concave in pt+1jt+1, the value
function ¹ V (st) under AOP will be lower than under NL.13
4.2 A special case when forward-looking variables do not reveal any further
information
A special case that is simpler to deal with is when
A21j = A21; A22j = A22; B2j = B2; C2j = 0 (j 2 Nj). (4.18)
13 It remains to clarify the concavity properties of the conditional and unconditional value functions. Kiefer [7]
examines the properties of a value function, including concavity, under Bayesian learning for a special case.
15That is, the matrices A21, A22, and B2 are independent of j, and the matrix C2 = 0, so
xt = ~ x(Xt;zt;it) ´ A¡1
22 (zt ¡ A21Xt ¡ B2it):
In that case, the observation of xt does not reveal any further information about jt. This implies
that the updating equation (4.5) collapses to
p+
tjt = ptjt;
so the prediction equation (4.6) is simply
pt+1jt = P0ptjt.
In particular, we then have
xt = x(st) ´ ~ x[Xt;z(st);i(st)];
pt+1jt+1 = Q(st;zt;it;jt+1;"t+1);
st+1 = g(st;zt;it;°t;jt+1;"t+1);
¹ g(st;jt+1;"t+1) ´ g(st;z(st);i(st);°(st);jt+1;"t+1):
That is, there is in this case no separate dependence of st+1 and xt on jt and "t beyond st: This
special case also makes the case of Bayesian optimal policy simpler.
5 Bayesian optimal policy
Finally, we consider the BOP case, when optimal policy is determined while taking the updating
equation (4.13) into account. That is, we now allow the policymaker to choose it taking into
account that this will a®ect pt+1jt+1, which in turn will a®ect future expected losses. That is,
optimal experimentation is allowed. For the BOP case, there is hence no distinction between the
\perceived" and \true" transition equation.
The transition equation for the BOP case is then
st+1 ´
2
4
Xt+1
¥t
pt+1jt+1
3
5 = g(st;zt;it;°t;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1)
´
2
4
A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1~ x(st;zt;it;jt;"t) + B1jt+1it + C1jt+1"t+1
°t
Q(st;zt;it;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1)
3
5: (5.1)
16Then the dual optimization problem can be written as (3.5) subject to the above transition equation
(5.1).
However, in the Bayesian case, matters simplify somewhat, as we do not need to compute the
conditional value function ^ V (st;jt): We note that the second term on the right side of (3.5) can be
written as
Et^ V (st+1;jt+1) ´ E
h
^ V (st+1;jt+1)
¯
¯ ¯ st
i
:
Since, in the Bayesian case, the beliefs do satisfy the law of iterated expectations, this is then the
same as
E
h
^ V (st+1;jt+1)
¯ ¯
¯ st
i
= E
2
4 ^ V
0
@
2
4
Xt+1(jt+1;"t+1)
¥t
pt+1jt+1(Xt+1(jt+1;"t+1))
3
5;jt+1
1
A
¯
¯ ¯
¯ ¯ ¯
st
3
5
= E
8
<
:
E
2
4 ^ V
0
@
2
4
Xt+1(jt+1;"t+1)
¥t
pt+1jt+1(Xt+1(jt+1;"t+1))
3
5;jt+1
1
A
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
Xt+1;pt+1jt+1(Xt+1)
3
5
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
¯ ¯
st
9
=
;
= E
2
4 ~ V
0
@
2
4
Xt+1(jt+1;"t+1)
¥t
pt+1jt+1(Xt+1(jt+1;"t+1))
3
5
1
A
¯ ¯ ¯
¯ ¯
¯
st
3
5
= E
h
~ V (st+1)
¯
¯ ¯ st
i
;
where we use the de¯nition of ~ V (st), that Xt+1 is a function of jt+1 and "t+1, and that pt+1jt+1 is
a function of Xt+1. Appendix B provides a more detailed proof.
Thus, the Bellman equation for the Bayesian optimal policy is
~ V (st) = max
°t
min
(zt;it)
Etf~ L( ~ Xt;zt;it;°t;jt;"t) + ±~ V [g(st;zt;it;°t;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1)]g
´ max
°t
min
(zt;it)
X
j pjtjt
Z · ~ L( ~ Xt;zt;it;°t;j;"t)
+±
P
k Pjk ~ V [g(st;zt;it;°t;j;"t;k;"t+1)]
¸
'("t)'("t+1)d"td"t+1;
(5.2)
where the transition equation is given by (5.1).
The solution to the optimization problem can be written
~ {t ´
2
4
zt
it
°t
3
5 = ~ {(st) ´
2
4
z(st)
i(st)
°(st)
3
5 = F( ~ Xt;ptjt) ´
2
4
Fz( ~ Xt;ptjt)
Fi( ~ Xt;ptjt)
F°( ~ Xt;ptjt)
3
5; (5.3)
xt = x(st;jt;"t) ´ ~ x(Xt;z(st);i(st);jt;"t) ´ Fx( ~ Xt;ptjt;jt;"t): (5.4)
Because of the nonlinearity of (4.13) and (5.1), the solution is no longer linear in ~ Xt for given ptjt.
The dual value function, ~ V (st), is no longer quadratic in ~ Xt for given ptjt. The value function of
17the primal problem, V (st), is given by, equivalently, (3.11), (4.15) (with the equilibrium transition
equation (4.14) with the solution (5.3)), or
V (st) =
X
j
pjtjt
Z ½
L[Xt;x(st;j;"t);i(st);j]
+±
P
k PjkV [¹ g(st;j;"t;k;"t+1)]
¾
'("t)'("t+1)d"td"t+1: (5.5)
It it is also no longer quadratic in ~ Xt for given ptjt. Thus more detailed numerical methods are
necessary in this case to ¯nd the optimal policy and the value function.
5.1 The case without forward-looking variables
In the case without forward-looking variables, the transition equation for st+1jt+1 is
st+1 = g(st;it;jt+1;"t+1) ´
·
Ajt+1Xt + Bjt+1it + Cjt+1"t+1
Q(st;it;jt+1;"t+1)
¸
;
and the optimal policy is determined by the Bellman equation
V (st) = min
it
Etf[L(Xt;i(st);jt) + ±V [g(st;it;jt+1;"t+1)]g
= min
it
X
j pjtjt
½
L(Xt;it;j) + ±
X
k Pjk
Z
V [g(st;it;k;"t+1)]'("t+1)d"t+1
¾
:
This results in the optimal policy function
it = i(st) ´ Fi(st):
Because of the nonlinearity of Q(st;it;jt+1;"t+1), the optimal policy function is no longer linear in
Xt for given ptjt, and the value function is no longer quadratic in Xt for given ptjt. The equilibrium
transition equation is
st+1 = ¹ g(st;jt+1;"t+1) ´ g(st;i(st);jt+1;"t+1):
5.2 The special case when forward-looking variables do not reveal any further
information
As above, the special case (4.18) makes it unnecessary to deal with the details of the updating
equation (4.11) and the separate dependence of st+1 on jt and "t. The transition equation is simply
st+1 ´
2
4
Xt+1
¥t
pt+1jt+1
3
5 = g(st;zt;it;°t;jt+1;"t+1)
´
2
4
A11jt+1Xt + A12jt+1~ x(st;zt;it) + B1jt+1it + C1jt+1"t+1
°t
Q(st;zt;it;jt+1;"t+1)
3
5:
185.3 Bayesian optimal policy with endogenous mode transition
In the baseline formulation of the model, the mode transition matrix is given, so the model uncer-
tainty represented by the Markov chain of the modes is independent of the state of the economy
and the policy choice. Assume now that the mode transition probabilities are instead endogenous
and do depend on Xt, xt, and it. That is, the transition matrix depends on Xt, xt, and it,
P = P(Xt;xt;it) ´ [Pjk(Xt;xt;it)]:
Let
~ P(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t) ´ P[Xt; ~ x(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t);it];
where we have used (3.3).
Then equation (4.6) is replaced by
pt+1jt = ~ P(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t)0p+
tjt; (5.6)
and (5.6) is used instead of (4.6) in the de¯nition of Q(st;zt;it;jt;"t;jt+1;"t+1). Furthermore,
everywhere, Pjk is replaced by ~ Pjk(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t). The rest of the problems remains the same.
Thus, formally, the extension to endogenous mode transitions is easy.
6 Simple examples
In this section we present some simple examples which help to illuminate the bene¯ts of learning and
experimentation. First we consider a backward-looking case, then add forward-looking components.
6.1 A backward-looking example
We consider the simplest possible example, where nX = 1, nx = 0, ni = 1, n" = 1, and Nj = f1;2g,
Xt+1 = Ajt+1Xt + Bjt+1it + Cjt+1"t+1;
where "t is normally distributed with zero mean and unit variance. We specify that A1 = A2 = 1
and C1 = C2 = 1, so
Xt+1 = Xt + Bjt+1it + "t+1.
Furthermore, B1 = ¡1:5 and B2 = ¡0:5. That is, the instrument it has a larger e®ect on Xt+1 in
mode 1 than in mode 2. We assume that the modes are quite persistent,
P ´
·
P11 1 ¡ P11
1 ¡ P22 P22
¸
=
·
0:98 0:02
0:02 0:98
¸
:
19It follows that the stationary distribution of the modes satis¯es ¹ p ´ (¹ p1; ¹ p2)0 = (0:5;0:5)0. We
note that the predicted probability of mode 1 in period t + 1, p1;t+1jt, is similar to the perceived
probability of mode 1 in period t, since the modes are so persistent,
p1;t+1jt = p1tjtP11 + (1 ¡ p1tjt)(1 ¡ P22) = 0:02 + 0:96p1tjt: (6.1)
We ¯nally assume that the period loss function satis¯es
Lt =
1
2
X2
t .
For this simple example, the state st ´ (X0
t;p0
tjt)0 can be represented by (Xt;p1t)0, where we write
p1t for p1;tjt, the perceived probability of mode 1 in period t.
Figure 6.1, panel a, shows the resulting value function V (Xt;p1t) for the optimal policy under
no learning (NL), as a function of p1t for three di®erent values of Xt.14 Panel b shows the value
function for the Bayesian optimal policy (BOP) as a function of p1t, for the same three di®erent
values of Xt. Panel c plots the di®erence between the loss under BOP and NL. We see that the
loss under BOP is signi¯cantly lower than under NL, albeit less so for high values of p1t. Panel d
shows the di®erence between the loss under BOP and the adaptive optimal policy (AOP). We see
that the loss under BOP is lower than under AOP, but only modestly so.
Taken together, these results show that there is indeed bene¯t from learning in this example,
although the bene¯ts from experimentation are quite modest here. By moving from the NL case to
AOP, and thus updating beliefs, policymakers are able to capture most of the bene¯t of the fully
Bayesian optimal policy. The additional incremental improvement from AOP to BOP, arising from
the experimentation motive, is much less signi¯cant. Thus the AOP, which we recall is relatively
simple to compute and to implement recursively in real time, provides a good approximation to
the fully optimal policy. Of course, these conclusions are dependent on the particular parameters
chosen for this simple example, but we have found similar qualitative results in a number of other
examples that we have analyzed.
Figure 6.2 shows the corresponding optimal policy functions. Panel a shows the optimal policy
under NL as a function of Xt for three di®erent values of p1t. For given p1t, the optimal policy
function under NL is linear in Xt. Panel b shows the optimal policy function under BOP. On this
scale, the nonlinearity in Xt for given p1t is not apparent. Panel c shows the di®erence between
the optimal policy under BOP and NL. Here we see that the Bayesian optimal policy is indeed
14 The example is solved with collocation methods via modi¯cations of some of the programs of the CompEcon
Toolbox described by Miranda and Fackler [10]
20Figure 6.1: Losses from no learning (NL), adaptive optimal policy (AOP), and Bayesian optimal
policy (BOP)
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nonlinear in Xt for given p1t. Panel d plots the di®erence in the policies for all p1t and all Xt in the
interval [¡5;5]. We see that the di®erence is largest for small p1t, where the Bayesian optimal policy
responds more aggressively (it is larger for positive values of Xt and smaller for negative values)
than the adaptive policy. We discuss below how more aggressive policies can sharpen inference,
and thus lessen future expected losses.
6.2 The interaction of learning and control
In order to better understand the nature of the di®erent solutions and the role of learning, we
consider ¯gures 6.3 and 6.4 which depict how beliefs respond to di®erent policies. First, ¯gure
6.3 shows the components of the Bayesian updating rule. Panel a shows the conditional density
function of the innovation in Xt+1, Zt+1 ´ Xt+1¡EtXt+1, conditional on the mode jt+1 ´ k where
k = 1 or 2 in period t+1, for given Xt and it. Here Xt is set equal to 1, and it is set equal to 0:8; this
value for it is approximately the optimal policy under NL for Xt = 1 and p1;t+1jt = p1tjt = ¹ p1 = 0:5.
Panel b shows the unconditional (that is, not conditional on k) density function of the innovation
21Figure 6.2: Policy for no learning (NL) and Bayesian optimal policy (BOP)
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in Xt+1, for Xt = 1, it = 0:8, and p1;t+1jt = 0:5. Panel c plots the resulting updated p1;t+1jt+1 as
a function of the innovation in Xt+1. By Bayes Theorem, it is given by the ratio of the density of
the innovation conditional on k = 1 to the unconditional density of the innovation multiplied by
the period-t prediction of mode 1 in period t + 1, p1;t+1jt = 0:5,
p1;t+1jt+1 =
Ã(Xt+1 ¡ EtXt+1 jk = 1;Xt;it)
Ã(Xt+1 ¡ EtXt+1 jp1;t+1jt;Xt;it)
p1;t+1jt. (6.2)
We see that p1;t+1jt+1 is decreasing in Xt+1 ¡ EtXt+1. The larger the innovation in Xt+1, the less
likely the mode 1, since, for a given positive it, mode 1 is associated with a larger negative e®ect
of it on Xt+1 and hence, everything else equal, a lower Xt. This is apparent in panel a, where
the probability density of the innovation conditional on mode 1 is to the left of the density of the
innovation conditional on mode 2.
Suppose now that the policymaker increases the value of the policy instrument, say from 0.8
to 1.4. Then, a larger value of the policy instrument multiplies the mode-dependent coe±cient
Bjt+1. As a result, the conditional probability densities in panel a move further apart, and the
unconditional density in panel b becomes more spread out. As a result, the updated p1;t+1jt+1
22Figure 6.3: Probability density of Xt+1 and updating of pt+1jt+1
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becomes more sensitive to the innovation. This is shown in panel d, where p1;t+1jt+1 as a function
of the innovation is plotted for both it = 0:8 and it = 1:4. Thus, with a larger absolute value of the
instrument, for a given realization of the innovation, the updated p1;t+1jt+1 is closer to the extremes
of 0 or 1. The policymaker becomes less uncertain about the mode in period t + 1. In this sense,
we can say that a larger instrument setting improves the updating and learning of the distribution
of the modes. Thus, if the policymaker perceives that learning is bene¯cial, he or she would in this
example be inclined to experiment by pursuing more aggressive policy, in the sense of increasing
the magnitude of the instrument for a given Xt.
We will return shortly to the issue of when learning and experimentation is bene¯cial. But
¯rst, we note that, given the conditional and unconditional distribution of the innovation in Xt+1
illustrated in ¯gure 6.3, panels a and b, and the relation between the updated probability p1;t+1jt+1
and the realization of the innovation in Xt+1 illustrated in panel c, we can infer the conditional
and unconditional probability densities of p1;t+1jt+1.15 These are shown in ¯gure 6.4, panels a and
b, respectively, for it = 0:8. Furthermore, panels c and d show the conditional and unconditional
15 If Ãp(p) and ÃZ(Z) denote the probability densities of scalars p and Z, and p is an invertible and continuously
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probability densities of p1;t+1jt+1 when it is increased to 1.4. Comparing panels c and a, we see that
a higher absolute value of the instrument moves the conditional densities of beliefs further apart.
Thus with a more aggressive policy, beliefs are much more sharply concentrated around the truth.
Comparing panels d and b, we see that the unconditional density is further spread out, and in this
case becomes bimodal. Thus, the mass of the unconditional distribution is closer to the extremes,
0 and 1, indicating that the uncertainty about the mode in period t + 1 falls.
When is learning bene¯cial? In order to understand this, we again look at ¯gure 6.1, panel a,
which shows the value function under NL, as a function of p1t = p1tjt for three di®erent values of
Xt. Consider a policymaker in period t, with the perceived probability of mode 1 in period t equal
to 0.5, so p1t = p1tjt = 0:5. Since 0.5 is the stationary probability for this Markov chain, this also
means that the period-t predicted probability of mode 1 in period t+1, given by (6.1), is also 0.5.
Under NL, the policymaker's predicted and updated probabilities are the same, p1;t+1jt+1 = p1;t+1jt.
di®erentiable function of Z, p = Q(Z), the densities are related by
Ãp(p) = ÃZ(Q
¡1(p))dQ
¡1(p)=dp:
24Figure 6.5: Loss from adaptive optimal policy (AOP)
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Thus in this case the conditional and unconditional probability distributions ofp1;t+1jt+1 in ¯gure
6.4, panels a and b, are the same and are simply given by a spike with unit probability mass for
p1;t+1jt+1 = 0:5.
Under adaptive optimal policy (AOP), the policymaker applies the same policy function as
under NL, but now he or she uses Bayes Theorem to update the perceived probability of mode 1,
p1;t+1jt+1, after observing the innovation in Xt+1 at the beginning of period t+1. That is, from the
vantage point of period t, the updated probability p1;t+1jt+1 in period t+1 is a random variable with
the probability density shown in ¯gure 6.4, panel b. As discussed above, the mean of this probability
density is the predicted probability, p1;t+1jt = 0:5. Comparing the perceived probability distribution
of p1;t+1jt+1 under AOP with what prevails under NL, we see a dramatic mean-preserving spread,
from a spike with unit mass at 0:5 to the spread-out probability density shown in panel b.
As discussed above, such a mean-preserving spread reduces the intertemporal loss if the value
function under NL is strictly concave as function of p1;t+1jt+1. In this case Jensen's inequality
implies that the expected future loss falls when the future beliefs become more dispersed.16 In
¯gure 6.1, panel a, we see that the value function under NL indeed is concave, more so for higher
values of Xt+1 and lower values of p1;t+1jt+1, but also in the vicinity of p1;t+1jt+1 = 0:5. Thus,
we understand why the loss is lower under AOP, where the policymaker follows the same policy
function, it+1 = F(Xt+1;p1;t+1jt+1), as under NL but updates the probability of mode 1 according
to (6.2).
Under AOP, the policymaker does not consider adjusting the policy in order to change the shape
of the density of p1;t+1jt+1 and thereby improve the updating of p1;t+1. Our previous discussion
16 Kiefer [7] examines the properties of a value function under Bayesian learning.
25of ¯gure 6.4 has revealed that increasing the absolute value of the instrument in this example will
lead to a larger mean-preserving spread. In the case of increasing the instrument from 0.8 to 1.4,
this increases the spread from that of the density in panel b to the that of the density in panel d.
The value function under AOP is shown in ¯gure 6.5. Compared with the value function under
NL in panel a of ¯gure 6.1, it is more concave for low values of p1t and somewhat °atter for higher
values.
Now, in the BOP case, the policymaker considers the in°uence of his or her policy on inference.
Thus he or she has the option of increasing the magnitude of the policy instrument somewhat,
in order to increase the mean-preserving spread of the density of p1;t+1jt+1, the bene¯t of which
depends on the concavity of the AOP value function. The cost of this is an increase in the expected
period loss in period t+1 from its minimum. The result of the optimal tradeo® is shown in panels c
and d of ¯gure 6.2 above. In this particular example, the policymaker chooses not to deviate much
from the policy under NL and AOP. That is, he or she does not experiment much, except for small
values of p1;t+1jt ¼ p1tjt where incidentally the concavity of the value function under AOP is the
largest.17 Furthermore, from ¯gure 6.1, panels c and d, we see that the fall in the intertemporal
loss from AOP to BOP is quite modest, and most of the fall in the loss arises in moving from NL
to AOP.
Thus, in this example, the main bene¯t from learning arises without any experimentation.
Although the amount of experimentation, measured as the policy di®erence between BOP and
AOP, is substantial for low values of p1tjt, the bene¯t in terms of additional loss is quite small.
Furthermore, in the above example there is no direct cost whatsoever of a large instrument or
a large change in the instrument. If such a cost is added, the magnitude and the bene¯ts of
experimentation (moving from AOP to BOP) shrink, whereas there is still substantial bene¯ts
from learning (moving from NL to AOP).
6.3 A forward-looking example
We now turn to a closely related example with forward-looking elements. The main implications
of the backward-looking example are preserved, with one important quali¯cation. The Lagrange
multiplier associated with the equation for the forward-looking variable becomes a state variable,
and this introduces some changes in the optimal policy in response to movements in this new
17 The approximation p1;t+1jt ¼ p1tjt is justi¯ed by (6.1). Because the modes are so persistent, the predicted
probability is close to the current perceived probability.
26Figure 6.6: Losses from no learning (NL), adaptive optimal policy (AOP), and Bayesian optimal
policy (BOP) for the forward-looking example with ¥t¡1 = 0.
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multiplier state ¥t¡1. Rather than being symmetric around Xt = 0, in the forward-looking case
policies become asymmetric when ¥t¡1 6= 0.
The example here is perhaps the simplest possible in the forward-looking case. There is one
predetermined variable, one forward-looking variable, and two modes. The transition equation for
the predetermined variable and the equation for the forward-looking variable are:
Xt+1 = Bjt+1it + "t+1; (6.3)
Etxt+1 = Xt + xt: (6.4)
In the backward-looking example above, the uncontrolled system was a random walk which
policy stabilized. The current system is similar, in that the jump variable xt is essentially a random
walk in the absence of control. As in the backward-looking case, we suppose that the instrument
is more e®ective in mode 1:
B1 = ¡1:5; B2 = ¡0:5:
27Figure 6.7: Policy for no learning (NL) and Bayesian optimal policy (BOP) for the forward-looking
example with ¥t¡1 = 0.
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Again, we assume that the modes are highly persistent with transition matrix:
P =
·
0:98 0:02
0:02 0:98
¸
:
The loss function is similar in spirit to the backward-looking case, although di®erent in details:
Lt =
1
2
x2
t + 0:1i2
t; ± = 0:95:
Since the forward-looking variable xt now has the random walk elements, it is also the one which
receives the most weight in the loss function. We also include a small control cost term.
Figure 6.6 is analogous to ¯gure 6.1 above. In the current ¯gure, panel a shows the resulting
value function V (Xt;¥t¡1;p1t) for the optimal policy under NL, as a function of p1t for three
di®erent values of Xt, and with ¥t¡1 = 0. The shadow cost of the forward-looking constraint is
zero, and thus this value is most comparable to the backward-looking case. Below we discuss the
di®erences in results when the multiplier ¥t¡1 di®ers from zero. Again, panel b shows the value
function for the BOP as a function of p1t, while panel c plots the di®erence between the loss under
28Figure 6.8: Di®erences in policy between Bayesian optimal policy (BOP) and no learning (NL)
for the forward-looking example with di®erent ¥t¡1 values. Solid line: p1t = 0:08; dashed line:
p1t = 0:36; dot-dash line: p1t = 0:92.
−5 0 5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
a. BOP-NL, Ξt−1 = −4
X
t
i
t
−5 0 5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
b. BOP-NL, Ξt−1 = 0
X
t
i
t
−5 0 5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
c. BOP-NL, Ξt−1 = 4
X
t
i
t
B
O
P
a
n
d
N
L
,
a
n
d
p
a
n
e
l
d
s
h
o
w
s
t
h
e
d
i
®
e
r
e
n
c
e
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
t
h
e
l
o
s
s
u
n
d
e
r
B
O
P
a
n
d
A
O
P
.
O
v
e
r
a
l
l
,
t
h
e
s
e
r
e
s
u
l
t
s
a
r
e
q
u
i
t
e
s
i
m
i
l
a
r
t
o
t
h
e
b
a
c
k
w
a
r
d
-
l
o
o
k
i
n
g
c
a
s
e
.
T
h
e
v
a
l
u
e
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
a
p
p
e
a
r
n
e
a
r
l
y
l
i
n
e
a
r
w
i
t
h
s
o
m
e
m
o
d
e
s
t
c
o
n
c
a
v
i
t
y
,
s
u
g
g
e
s
t
i
n
g
t
h
a
t
l
e
a
r
n
i
n
g
i
s
b
e
n
e
¯
c
i
a
l
b
u
t
e
x
p
e
r
i
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
h
a
s
m
o
d
e
s
t
e
®
e
c
t
s
.
I
n
d
e
e
d
,
w
e
a
g
a
i
n
s
e
e
t
h
a
t
t
h
e
l
o
s
s
u
n
d
e
r
B
O
P
i
s
s
i
g
n
i
¯
c
a
n
t
l
y
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
a
n
u
n
d
e
r
N
L
,
w
h
i
l
e
t
h
e
l
o
s
s
u
n
d
e
r
B
O
P
i
s
l
o
w
e
r
t
h
a
n
u
n
d
e
r
A
O
P
,
b
u
t
o
n
l
y
m
o
d
e
s
t
l
y
s
o
.
F
i
g
u
r
e
6
.
7
i
s
a
n
a
l
o
g
o
u
s
t
o
¯
g
u
r
e
6
.
2
a
b
o
v
e
,
s
h
o
w
i
n
g
t
h
e
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
o
p
t
i
m
a
l
p
o
l
i
c
y
f
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
F
o
r
t
h
e
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
¯
g
u
r
e
,
w
e
a
g
a
i
n
s
e
t
¥ t¡1 = 0. Panel a shows the optimal policy under NL as a
function of Xt for three di®erent values of p1t, while panel b shows the optimal policy function under
BOP. As above, the nonlinearity in the BOP policy is not apparent at this scale. Panel c shows
the di®erence between the optimal policy under BOP and NL, while panel d plots the di®erence
in the policies for all p1t and all Xt in the interval [¡5;5]. As in the backward-looking case, the
di®erence between policies is largest for small p1t, where the Bayesian optimal policy responds more
aggressively. Also note that, for a given p1t, the magnitudes of the di®erences, and hence the e®ects
of experimentation on policy, are symmetric about the Xt origin. That is, it is larger for positive
values of Xt and smaller for negative values, but the absolute value of the e®ect on it is the same
when jXtj is the same.
We now examine the e®ects of the forward-looking constraint, as summarized by di®erent values
of ¥t¡1. A nonzero ¥t¡1 correspond to a constraint from previous commitment and will therefore
increase the loss compared to when ¥t¡1 is zero. However, a more interesting e®ect is on the
experimentation component of policy. In particular, for di®erent ¥t¡1 values some asymmetries in
29the policy appear. This is evident in ¯gure 6.8, which plots the di®erences in the optimal policy
under BOP and NL for three di®erent values of p1t in each panel, now for di®erent ¥t¡1. Panel b
repeats panel c of ¯gure 6.7 with ¥t¡1 = 0, while in panel a we set ¥t¡1 = ¡4 and in panel c we
set ¥t¡1 = 4. We see that, in each case, the experimentation component of policy tends to lead
toward more aggressive policy, but this e®ect is altered by the multiplier ¥t¡1. Comparing panel
a to panel b, we see that when ¥t¡1 < 0 the experimentation component is greater for positive
values of Xt and smaller for negative values. The converse happens in panel c, as when ¥t¡1 > 0
the experimentation component is smaller for positive values.
These di®erences re°ect a feature of the tradeo® between experimentation and control which
is absent in the backward-looking case. Experimentation tends to push toward more aggressive
policy to sharpen the inference about the modes. However, when ¥t¡1 < 0, the forward-looking
constraint implies a larger loss penalty for more negative Xt and it, which dampens this e®ect.
But, for positive Xt, the loss is smaller with ¥t¡1 > 0, which ampli¯es the e®ect.
More precisely, in this case the term (2.6) that must be added to intertemporal loss function to
represent previous commitments is
¥t¡1
1
±
xt:
A negative ¥t¡1 hence makes it desirable to increase xt, everything else equal. By (6.3) and (6.4),
xt is determined by
xt = ¡Xt + Etxt+1 = ¡Xt ¡ Et
1 X
¿=0
Xt+1+¿ = ¡Xt ¡ Et
1 X
¿=0
Bjt+1+¿it+¿;
where we assume that the sums converge. Since Bj < 0 for j = 1 and 2, increasing xt means
increasing it. Hence, for ¥t¡1 < 0 (> 0) and for each Xt and p1t, under both NL and BOP the
optimal it is higher (lower), and more so for BOP.
In economic terms, with forward-looking variables in the model, the key considerations are not
just sharpening inference versus inducing more volatility, but also in°uencing the expectations of
future variables. As we have seen the optimal policy embodies a rather intricate tradeo® amongst
these factors. However it remains the case that the gains from optimal experimentation are much
smaller than the gains from learning.
307 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a relatively general framework for analyzing model uncertainty and
the interactions between learning and optimization. While this is a classic issue, very little to date
has been done for systems with forward-looking variables, which are essential elements of modern
models for policy analysis. Our speci¯cation is general enough to cover many practical cases of
interest, but yet remains relatively tractable in implementation. This is de¯nitely true for cases
when decision makers do not learn from the data they observe (our no learning case) or when they
do learn but do not account for learning in optimization (our adaptive optimal policy case). In
both of these cases, we have developed e±cient algorithms for solving for the optimal policy which
can handle relatively large models with multiple modes and many state variables. However in the
case of the Bayesian optimal policy, where the experimentation motive is taken into account, we
must solve more complex numerical dynamic programming problems. Thus we are haunted by the
curse of dimensionality, forcing us to study relatively small and simple models.
Thus an issue of much practical importance is the size of the experimentation component of
policy, and the losses entailed by abstracting from it. While our results in this paper are far from
comprehensive, they suggest that in practical settings the experimentation motive may not be a
concern. The above and similar examples that we have considered indicate that the bene¯ts of
learning (moving from NL to AOP) may be substantial, whereas the bene¯ts from experimentation
(moving from AOP to BOP) are modest or even insigni¯cant. If this preliminary ¯nding stands
up to scrutiny, experimentation in economic policy in general and monetary policy in particular
may not be very bene¯cial, in which case there is little need to face the di±cult ethical and other
issues involved in conscious experimentation in economic policy. Furthermore, the AOP is much
easier to compute and implement than the BOP. To have this truly be a robust implication, more
simulations and cases need to be examined. In particular, it will be important to see how these
results are a®ected in more realistic and empirically relevant settings. We are in the progress of
carrying out such analysis.
31Appendix
A Details of the algorithm for the no-learning case
Here we provide more detail on the setup of the model in the no-learning case and adapt the
algorithm in Svensson and Williams [13] (DFT) to our revised speci¯cation. Most of this should
probably go in a revision of DFT in the future.
A.1 Setup
Our ¯rst task is to write the extended MJLQ system for the saddlepoint problem. We suppose that
we start with an initial period loss function which has the form
Lt =
2
4
Xt
xt
it
3
5
0 2
4
Q11j Q12j N1j
Q0
12j Q22j N2j
N0
1j N0
2j Rj
3
5
2
4
Xt
xt
it
3
5:
Then the dual loss is
~ Lt = Lt ¡ °0
tzt + ¥0
t¡1
1
±
Hjxt:
We now substitute in for xt using
xt = ~ x(Xt;zt;it;jt;"t)
´ A¡1
22;jzt ¡ A¡1
22;jA21;jXt ¡ A¡1
22;jB2;jit ¡ A¡1
22;jC2;j"t
´ AxX;jXt + Axz;jzt + Axi;jit + Axv;jvt; (A.1)
where in the last line we introduce new notation for the shock. Since we assume C1j"t is independent
of C2j"t; we ¯nd it useful to denote the shock "t in the forward-looking equation by vt. After this
substitution we want to express the laws of motion and dual loss in terms of the expanded state
~ Xt = [X0
t;¥0
t¡1]0 and the expanded controls ~ {t = [z0
t;i0
t;°0
t]0. Suppressing time and mode subscripts
for the time being (all are t and j, respectively (except t ¡ 1 on ¥t¡1)), we see that the dual loss
can be written explicitly as
~ Lt = X0 ¡
Q11 + A0
xXQ22AxX + 2A0
xXQ0
12
¢
X + 2X0 ¡
N1 + Q12Axi + A0
xXQ22Axi + A0
xXN2
¢
i
+ 2z0(A0
xzQ0
12 + A0
xzQ22AxX)X + ¥01
±
HAxXX + ¥01
±
HAxzz + ¥01
±
HAxii
¡ °0z + z0(A0
xzQ22Axz)z + i0(R + A0
xiQ22Axi + 2A0
xiN2)i + 2z0(A0
xzN2 + A0
xzQ22Axi)i
+ v0(A0
xvQ22Axv)v + cross terms in v;
32where we don't write out the cross terms since they have zero conditional expectations. Thus we
can write the dual loss (ignoring the cross terms in v)
~ Lt =
· ~ Xt
~ {t
¸0 · ~ Qj ~ Nj
~ N0
j ~ Rj
¸· ~ Xt
~ {t
¸
+ v0
t¤jvt;
where (again suppressing the j index)
~ Q =
· ~ Q11 ~ Q12
~ Q0
12 0
¸
;
~ Q11 = Q11 + A0
xXQ22AxX + 2A0
xXQ0
12;
~ Q12 =
1
2±
A0
xXH0;
~ N =
· ~ N11 ~ N12 0
~ N21 ~ N22 0
¸
;
~ N11 = Q12Axz + A0
xXQ22Axz;
~ N12 = N1 + Q12Axi + A0
xXQ22Axi + A0
xXN2;
~ N21 =
1
2±
HAxz;
~ N22 =
1
2±
HAxi;
~ R =
2
4
~ R11 ~ R12 ~ R13
~ R0
12 ~ R22 0
~ R0
13 0 0
3
5;
~ R11 = A0
xzQ22Axz;
~ R12 = A0
xzN2 + A0
xxQ22Axi;
~ R13 = ¡I=2;
~ R22 = R + A0
xiQ22Axi + 2A0
xiN2;
¤ = A0
xvQ22Axv:
Similarly, the law of motion for ~ Xt can then be written
~ Xt+1 = ~ Ajtjt+1 ~ Xt + ~ Bjtjt+1~ {t + ~ Cjtjt+1~ "t+1;
where
~ "t+1 =
·
"t+1
ºt
¸
; ~ Ajk =
·
A11k + A12kAxXj 0
0 0
¸
;
~ Bjk =
·
A12kAxzj B1k + A12kAxij 0
0 0 I
¸
; ~ Cjk =
·
C1k A12kAxvj
0 0
¸
:
33Furthermore, for the case where C2j ´ 0 and the forward variables do not reveal the mode j, we
have that AxX;Axz;Axi are independent of the mode and Axv ´ 0, so the dependence on j in ~ Ajk,
~ Bjk, and ~ Cjk disappears.
A.2 Unobservable modes and forward-looking variables
Then we continue as in Appendix I of DFT. What follows is a correction and revision of Appendix
I.2.
The value function for the dual problem, ~ V (Xt;ptjt), will be quadratic in ~ Xt for given pt and
can be written
~ V ( ~ Xt;pt) ´ ~ X0
t ~ V (pt) ~ Xt + w(pt);
where
~ V (pt) ´
X
j pjt^ V (pt)j; w(pt) ´
X
j pjt ^ w(pt)j:
Here, ~ V (pt) and ^ V (pt)j are symmetric (nX + nx) £ (nX + nx) matrices and w(pt) and ^ w(pt)j are
scalars that are functions of pt. (Thus, we simplify the notation and we let ~ V (pt) and ^ V (pt)j
(j 2 Nj) denote the matrices ~ V ~ X ~ X(pt) and ^ VXX(pt;jt) in section 3.) They will satisfy the Bellman
equation
~ X0
t ~ V (pt) ~ Xt + w(pt) = max
°t
min
zt;it
X
j
pjt
(
~ X0
t ~ Qj ~ Xt + 2 ~ X0
t ~ Nj~ {t +~ {0
t ~ Rj~ {t + tr(¤j)
+±
P
k Pjk[ ~ X0
t+1;jk ^ V (P0pt)k ~ Xt+1;jk + ^ w(P0pt)k]
)
;
where
~ Xt+1;jk ´ ~ Ajk ~ Xt + ~ Bjk~ {t + ~ Cjk~ "t+1:
The ¯rst-order condition with respect to ~ {t is thus
X
j
pjt
"
~ X0
t ~ Nj +~ {0
t ~ Rj + ±
X
k
Pjk( ~ X0
t ~ A0
jk +~ {0
t ~ B0
jk)^ V (P0pt)k ~ Bjk
#
= 0:
We can rewrite the ¯rst-order conditions as
X
j
pjt
"
~ N0
j ~ Xt + ~ Rj~ {t + ±
X
k
Pjk ~ B0
jk ^ V (P0pt)k( ~ Ajk ~ Xt + ~ Bjk~ {t)
#
= 0:
It is then apparent that the ¯rst-order conditions can be written compactly as
J(pt)~ {t + K(pt) ~ Xt = 0; (A.2)
where
J(pt) ´
X
j
pjt
"
~ Rj + ±
X
k
Pjk ~ B0
jk ^ V (P0pt)k ~ Bjk
#
34K(pt) ´
X
j
pjt
"
~ N0
j + ±
X
k
Pjk ~ B0
jk ^ V (P0pt)k ~ Ajk
#
This leads to the optimal policy function,
~ {t = ~ F(pt) ~ Xt;
where
~ F(pt) ´ ¡J(pt)¡1K(pt):
Furthermore, the value-function matrix ~ V (pt) for the dual saddlepoint problem satis¯es
~ X0
t ~ V (pt) ~ Xt ´
X
j
pjt
(
~ X0
t ~ Qj ~ Xt + 2 ~ X0
t ~ Nj ~ F(pt) ~ Xt + ~ X0
t ~ F(pt)0 ~ Rj ~ F(pt) ~ Xt
+±
P
k Pjk ~ X0
t[ ~ A0
jk + ~ F(pt)0 ~ B0
jk]^ V (P0pt)k[ ~ Ajk + ^ Bjk ~ F(pt)] ~ Xt
)
:
This implies the following Riccati equations for the matrix functions ^ V (pt)j:
^ V (pt)j = ~ Qj + ~ Nj ~ F(pt) + ~ F(pt)0 ~ N0
j + ~ F(pt)0 ~ Rj ~ F(pt)
+ ±
X
k
Pjk[ ~ A0
jk + ~ F(pt)0 ~ B0
jk]^ V (P0pt)k[ ~ Ajk + ~ Bjk ~ F(pt)]:
The scalar functions ^ w(pt)j will satisfy the equations
^ w(pt)j = tr(¤j) + ±
X
k
Pjk[tr(^ V (P0pt)k ~ Cjk ~ C0
jk) + ^ w(P0pt)k]: (A.3)
The value function for the primal problem is
~ X0
tV (pt) ~ Xt + w(pt) ´ ~ X0
t ~ V (pt) ~ Xt + w(pt) ¡ ¥0
t¡1
1
±
X
j pjtHjFx ~ X(pt)j ~ Xt;
where we use that by (A.1) the equilibrium solution for xt can be written
xt = Fx ~ X(pt)j ~ Xt + Fxv(pt)jvt:
We may also ¯nd the conditional value function
~ X0
tV (pt)j ~ Xt + w(pt)j ´ ~ X0
t ~ V (pt)j ~ Xt + w(pt)j ¡ ¥0
t¡1
1
±
HjFx ~ X(pt)j ~ Xt (j 2 Nj).
A.3 An algorithm for the model with forward-looking variables
What follows is a correction and revision of Appendix I.3 of DFT.
Consider an algorithm for determining ~ F(pt), ~ V (pt), w(pt), ^ V (pt)j and ^ w(pt)j for a given distri-
bution of the modes in period t, pt. In order to get a starting point for the iteration, we assume that
35the modes become observable T + 1 periods ahead, that is, in period t + T + 1. Hence, from that
period on, the relevant solution is given by the matrices ~ Fj and ~ Vj and scalars wj for j 2 Nj, where
~ Fj is the optimal policy function, ~ Vj is the value-function matrix, and wj is the scalar in the value
function for the dual saddlepoint problem with observable modes determined by the algorithm in
the appendix of DFT.
We consider these matrices ~ Vj and scalars wj and the horizon T as known, and we will consider
an iteration for ¿ = T;T ¡1;:::;0 that determines ~ F(pt), ~ V (pt), and w(pt) as a function of T. The
horizon T will then be increased until ~ F(pt), ~ V (pt), and w(pt) have converged.
Let pt+¿;t for ¿ = 0;:::;T and given pt be determined by the prediction equation,
pt+¿;t = (P0)¿pt,
and let ^ V T+1
k = ~ Vk and ^ wT+1
k = wk (k 2 Nj). Then, for ¿ = T;T ¡1;:::;0; let the mode-dependent
matrices ^ V ¿
j and the mode-independent matrices ~ V ¿ and F¿ be determined recursively by
J¿ ´
X
j
pj;t+¿;t
"
~ Rj + ±
X
k
Pjk ~ B0
jk ^ V ¿+1
k ~ Bjk
#
;
K¿ ´
X
j
pj;t+¿;t
"
~ N0
j + ±
X
k
Pjk ~ B0
jk ^ V ¿+1
k ~ Ajk
#
;
~ F¿ = ¡(J¿)¡1K¿;
^ V ¿
j = ~ Qj + ~ Nj ~ F¿ + ~ F¿0 ~ N0
j + ~ F¿0 ~ Rj ~ F¿
+ ±
X
k
Pjk[ ~ A0
jk + ~ F¿0 ~ B0
jk]^ V ¿+1
k [ ~ Ajk + ~ Bk ~ F¿)];
^ w¿
j = tr(¤j) + ±
X
k
Pjk[tr(^ V ¿+1
k ~ Cjk ~ C0
jk) + ^ w¿+1
k ];
~ V ¿ =
X
j
pj;t+¿;t^ V ¿
j ;
w¿
j =
X
j
pj;t+¿;t ^ w¿
j:
This procedure will give ~ F0, ~ V 0 and w0 as functions of T. We let T increase until ~ F0 and ~ V 0
have converged. Then, ~ F(pt) = ~ F0, ~ V (pt) = ~ V 0, and w(pt) = w0. The value-function matrix V (pt)
(denoted V ~ X ~ X(pt) in section 3) for the primal problem will be given by
V (pt) ´ ~ V (pt) ¡
·
0 1
2¡X(pt)0
1
2¡X(pt) 1
2[¡¥(pt) + ¡¥(pt)0]
¸
;
where the matrix function
[¡X(pt) ¡¥(pt)] ´
1
±
X
j pjtHj[FxX(pt)j Fx¥(pt)j]
36is partitioned conformably with Xt and ¥t¡1. The conditional value function matrix V (pt)j for the
primal problem will be given by
V (pt)j ´ ^ V (pt)j ¡
·
0 1
2¡X(pt)0
j
1
2¡X(pt)j
1
2[¡¥(pt)j + ¡¥(pt)0
j]
¸
(j 2 Nj);
where ^ V (pt)j = ^ V 0
j and the matrix function
[¡X(pt)j ¡¥(pt)j] ´
1
±
Hj[FxX(pt)j Fx¥(pt)j]
is partitioned conformably with Xt and ¥t¡1.
B Verifying the law of iterated expectations in the case of Bayesian
optimal policy
It will be slightly simpler to use the general probability measure notation, Pr(¢j¢), although we will
translate this to the speci¯c cases at the end. We also write pt for ptjt, for simplicity. Finally, for
simplicity we only consider the case without forward-looking variables (so we need only deal with
Xt rather than ~ Xt). The generalization to forward-looking variables is straightforward.
Thus, we want to verify
Et^ V (st+1;jt+1) = EtV (st+1);
where V (st) ´ Et^ V (st;jt).
First, in the BOP case, we note that we can write pt+1 = ^ Q(Xt+1;Xt;pt;it), and so we can
de¯ne
¸ V (Xt+1;jt+1;Xt;pt;it) ´ ^ V (Xt+1; ^ Q(Xt+1;Xt;pt;it);jt+1):
Then we consider
Et^ V (Xt+1;pt+1;jt+1) ´
Z
¸ V (Xt+1;jt+1;Xt;pt;it)dPr(Xt+1;jt+1 jXt); (B.1)
where the identity speci¯es the notation for the joint probability measure of (Xt+1;jt+1), Pr(Xt+1;jt+1 jXt),
conditional on the information set in period t, Xt ´ ¾(fXt;Xt¡1;:::g) (that is, the sigma-algebra
generated by current and past realizations of Xs, s · t). We note that pt = E(jt jXt) is Xt-
measurable, that is, pt is a function of Xt. Furthermore, it is Xt-measurable. Hence, Et [¢] ´
E[¢jXt;pt;it] ´ E[¢jXt]. Also, we note that we can write
Et+1^ V (Xt+1;pt+1;jt+1) ´
Z
¸ V (Xt+1;jt+1;Xt;pt;it)dPr(jt+1 jXt+1) ´ V (Xt+1;pt+1):
37We will use two equivalent decompositions of the joint measure. First, perhaps the most natural
decomposition is
Pr(Xt+1;jt+1 = kjXt) = Pr(Xt+1 jjt+1 = k;Xt)Pr(jt+1 = kjXt)
=
X
j
Pr(Xt+1 jjt+1 = k;Xt)Pr(jt+1 = kjjt = j)Pr(jt = j jXt)
=
X
j
Pr(Xt+1 jjt+1 = k;Xt)Pjkpjt: (B.2)
Alternatively, we can decompose the joint measure as
Pr(Xt+1;jt+1 = `jXt) = Pr(jt+1 = `jXt+1;Xt)Pr(Xt+1 jXt)
= Pr(jt+1 = `jXt+1)
X
j
Pr(Xt+1 jjt = j;Xt)Pr(jt = j jXt)
= Pr(jt+1 = `jXt+1)
X
j;k
Pr(Xt+1 jjt = j;jt+1 = k;Xt)Pr(jt+1 = kjjt = j)Pr(jt = j jXt):
= p`;t+1
X
j;k
Pr(AkXt + Bkit + Ck"t+1 jjt = j;jt+1 = k;Xt)Pjkpjt
= p`;t+1
X
j;k
'("t+1)Pjkpjt: (B.3)
Thus, using the ¯rst decomposition, (B.2), with (B.1) we have an expression as in section 5.1,
Et^ V (Xt+1;pt+1;jt+1)
=
Z X
j;k
¸ V (AkXt + Bkit + Ck"t+1;k;Xt;pt;it)Pjkpjt'("t+1)d"t+1
=
Z X
j;k
^ V [AkXt + Bkit + Ck"t+1;Q(AkXt + Bkit + Ck"t+1;Xt;pt);k]Pjkpjt'("t+1)d"t+1
On the other hand, using the second decomposition, (B.3), we can write (B.1) as
Et^ V (Xt+1;pt+1;jt+1)
=
Z X
j;k;`
¸ V (Xt+1;`;Xt;pt;it)p`;t+1 Pjkpjt'("t+1)d"t+1
=
Z X
j;k
V (Xt+1; ^ Q(Xt+1;Xt;pt))Pjkpjt'("t+1)d"t+1
=
Z X
j;k
V [AkXt + Bkit + Ck"t+1;Q(AkXt + Bkit + Ck"t+1;Xt;pt)]Pjkpjt'("t+1)d"t+1
= EtV (Xt+1;pt+1)
38Note that, by averaging with respect to pt, we thus eliminate jt as a state variable and do not need
to compute the conditional value function ^ V (Xt;pt;jt).
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